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Donald Wayne Viney 
Pittsburg State University 
 
 Karen Armstrong says that her book is not “a history of the ineffable reality of God itself, 
which is beyond time and change, but a history of the way[s] men and women have perceived 
him from Abraham to the present day” (xx). Armstrong begins this adventure of ideas with the 
Babylonian creation myth two millennia before Christ and ends with speculations about God in 
the twentieth century. She summarizes a bewildering variety of perspectives, and the panorama 
of the “history of God” that she unveils is breathtaking. 
 
  Perhaps the book’s best feature is that Christianity has no privileged status. Armstrong 
admirably demonstrates that Judaism is no mere prelude to Christianity and Islam is not its coda. 
At a time when Jews and Muslims are often judged by their most radical members, Armstrong’s 
moderation is refreshing. On the other hand, she does not always do [462] justice to Christian 
figures. For instance, John Philoponus’s importance to Kalam argumentation is overlooked. Or 
again, Kabbalistic and Sufi mysticism are ably canvassed but medieval Christian mystics like 
Hildegaard of Bingen, Mechthild of Magdeburg, and Hadewijch of Antwerp are not mentioned. 
 
 Unfortunately, a number of errors mar the text. Aristotle’s universe is said to emanate 
from and be created by the unmoved mover (68-69); neither is true. Al-Kindi’s first cause 
argument is bungled; it does not proceed from the premise that everything has a cause to the 
contradictory conclusion that there is a wholly impassible deity (174). Armstrong also 
misunderstands Anselm’s famous modal argument (202); she fails to appreciate that it occurs in 
the context of a prayer (fides quaerens intellectum) and that his rationalism is balanced by the 
claim that God is “greater than can be conceived.” Finally, an important but minor player is 
identified as the founder of process theology, while the doyen of the movement, Charles 
Hartshorne, goes unnoticed (384). Despite a few missteps, the book is a heroic effort by a very 
knowledgeable person. 
 
 Armstrong is finally more successful in constructing a historical narrative than in 
avoiding the quagmire of her own theological hunches. Themes iterated throughout are that God 
is “Nothing”; God is subjective experience revealed only in the imagination; and God is ineffable 
(then why say that God is “beyond time and change”?). On these assumptions it is incoherent to 
claim that religious experiences are experiences of anything, including the ineffable. Yet, 
Armstrong confidently uses these ideas as a platform from which she accuses “objective” and 
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“anthropomorphic” theologies of being naïve and contributing to intolerance, bigotry, and “the 
death of God.”  
 
 Would-be theologians should doubtless heed Karl Rahner’s warning that “Theology 
knows well enough that stammering is all it can do.” Yet, nonsense is still nonsense, even when 
it is about God. If God is not, in some sense, existent, objective, and effable, then we should 
admit atheism or be silent. The alternative is to take the question of religious language as 
seriously as Aquinas, Duns Scotus and others have done and thereby offset Armstrong’s silence 
on the topic. Wittgenstein said that philosophical problems begin when language goes on 
holiday. Perhaps theological problems begin when language takes a permanent vacation. 
Armstrong is altogether too eager to pack her bags. 
         
          
 
 
 
